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SECRET’S OUT: THIRD CIRCUIT FINDS DELAWARE’S STATE-
SPONSORED ARBITRATION PROGRAM VIOLATES FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHT OF PUBLIC ACCESS IN
DELAWARE COALITION FOR OPEN
GOVERNMENT v. STRINE
DEAN J. SHAUGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine living in a country where the public and the press were
barred from viewing any and all judicial proceedings; only a select few
would understand the judicial process, and it would leave those in charge
unaccountable for their actions.1  While it is true that limiting access to
judicial proceedings might be necessary to protect privacy in certain in-
stances, a judicial system that bars the public and press from all proceed-
ings would completely shatter the notions of fairness and public
confidence that are currently an essential part of the American judicial
system.2  Without these notions, the basis upon which the American judi-
cial system was built would crumble.
This inevitable result illustrates the importance of the First Amend-
ment right of public access.3  The right of public access is an implicit right
contained in the First Amendment that guarantees the ability of the public
to attend certain judicial proceedings.  It is a key part of the judicial system
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 2012,
Christian Brothers University.  I would like to thank my family and friends,
especially my parents, Dean and Karen Shauger, and my sister, Caroline Shauger,
for all of their unwavering love and support in this and all of my endeavors, and
without which, this Casebrief would not have been possible.  I would also like to
thank my colleagues on the Villanova Law Review for all of the hard work and time
that went into the publication of this Casebrief.
1. See United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 839 (3d Cir. 1994) (recognizing
that “promotion of informed discussion of governmental affairs by providing the
public with the more complete understanding of the judicial system” and “serving
as a check on corrupt practices by exposing the judicial process to public scrutiny”
are benefits of open judicial proceedings (quoting United States v. Smith, 787 F.2d
111, 114 (3d Cir. 1986))).  In addition to public understanding and public scru-
tiny, the Third Circuit has found four other societal interests promoted by open-
ness. See id. (identifying six societal interests promoted by open court
proceedings).  For a full discussion of the six interests promoted by openness, see
infra note 48 and accompanying text.
2. For a further discussion of situations in which either public access or pri-
vacy is necessary, see infra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
3. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 556–57 (1980)
(“The right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First
Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exer-
cised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could
be eviscerated.”).
(877)
1
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because “without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have
exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the
press could be eviscerated.”4  Despite its paramount importance, this right
is a limited one.5  One area in which the right of public access can be
restricted is in proceedings that require secrecy to function properly, such
as grand jury proceedings.6  Determining how and when this right is ap-
plied is the subject of this Casebrief.
The Supreme Court first recognized the right of public access in Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,7 when Chief Justice Burger declared that
the First Amendment includes a right of public access to criminal trials.8
4. See id. at 557 (explaining First Amendment right of public access).
5. See PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 98–99 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining
that First Amendment right of public access is limited).  In finding that the right of
public access is limited, the court in PG Publishing examined the implicit limita-
tions on this right. See id. (“The First and Fourteenth Amendments bar govern-
ment from interfering in any way with a free press.  The Constitution does not,
however, require government to accord the press special access to information not
shared by members of the public generally.” (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 834 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (“It has generally been held that the First Amendment
does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information
not available to the public generally.”); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (“The
right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather
information.”).
6. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. for Riverside Cnty. (Press
II), 478 U.S. 1, 8–9, 27 (1986) (acknowledging that while most proceedings oper-
ate best when held in public, some proceedings would be “totally frustrated” if
held in public; for example “the proper functioning of our grand jury system de-
pends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings” (quoting United States v. Sells
Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983))).  The Court explained that while some
proceedings require privacy to function properly, others “plainly require public
access.” See id. at 9.  For instance, the Court had previously explained the impor-
tant role that openness played in maintaining the fairness—and the appearance of
fairness—in criminal trials and juror selection. See id. (citing Press-Enterprise Co.
v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cnty. (Press I), 464 U.S. 501, 501 (1984)).
7. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
8. See id. at 576–77 (“The explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and to publish
concerning what takes place at a trial would lose much meaning if access to ob-
serve the trial could . . . be foreclosed arbitrarily.”).  Although the right of public
access was not recognized by the Supreme Court until 1980, the right dates back to
English common law. See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1068 (3d.
Cir. 1984) (explaining that since its passage in 1267, Statute of Marlborough re-
quired that “all Causes ought to be heard, ordered, and determined before the
Judges of the King’s Courts openly in the King’s Courts . . . .” (quoting 2 EDWARD
COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 103 (6th ed. 1681))).  Additionally, the
fact that all judicial trials were held in public was one of the most distinct features
of English justice and “appears to have been the rule in England from time imme-
morial.” See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 556 (quoting EDWARD JENKS, THE
BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 73–74 (6th ed. 1967)).  This tradition continued in colonial
America where courthouses had a “central place in the life of communities they
served” and encouraged “the active participation of community members” in de-
veloping the “local practice of justice.”  Norman W. Spaulding, The Enclosure of
Justice: Courthouse Architecture, Due Process, and the Dead Metaphor of Trial, 24 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 311, 318–19 (2012).
2
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Subsequently, the Supreme Court has found a right of public access to the
voir dire of jurors in criminal trials and to certain preliminary criminal
hearings.9  In determining whether the right of public access applies to
certain judicial proceedings, the Court has developed the logic and expe-
rience test.10  This test considers whether there has been a history of open-
ness to the proceeding at issue and whether “access plays a significant
positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.”11
Arbitration is one type of proceeding that requires privacy in order to
function properly.12  In recent years, the use of arbitration to resolve busi-
ness and commercial disputes has been rapidly increasing.13  Between
1994 and 2004, the caseload of the American Arbitration Association’s In-
ternational Center for Dispute Resolution grew by almost 330%.14  Arbi-
9. See Press II, 478 U.S. at 10 (finding right of public access to preliminary
criminal proceedings as conducted in California); Press I, 464 U.S. at 511 (finding
right of public access to voir dire of jurors in criminal trials); Del. Coal. for Open
Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing El Vocero de P.R.
(Caribbean Int’l News Corp.) v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 149–50 (1993) (finding
right of public access to preliminary criminal proceedings as conducted in Puerto
Rico)).
10. See Press II, 478 U.S. at 8 (articulating bounds of logic and experience
test).
11. See id. (explaining logic prong of logic and experience test).  The logic
and experience test has its origins in Richmond Newspapers, but it has been devel-
oped by the Supreme Court in two subsequent cases: Press II and Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). See PG Publ’g Co. v.
Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining development of logic and
experience test by Supreme Court).
12. For a further discussion of the arbitration process, see infra notes 50–54
and accompanying text.
13. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 523 (Roth, J., dissenting) (noting that arbitration
has been increasing both in United States and abroad).  This increase in the use of
arbitration proceedings can be attributed to the fact that arbitration “resolv[es]
disputes expeditiously,” that there has been an “increase in commercial disputes
between businesses located in different countries,” and that “arbitration permits
the proceedings to be kept confidential, protecting trade secrets and sensitive fi-
nancial information.” Id.  Judge Roth also noted the advantages of arbitration as
articulated by the Supreme Court:
The point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration
processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the
type of dispute.  It can be specified, for example, that the decisionmaker
be a specialist in the relevant field, or that proceedings be kept confiden-
tial to protect trade secrets.  And the informality of arbitral proceedings is
itself desirable, reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute
resolution.
Id. at 523–24 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749
(2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see Brian JM Quinn, Arbitration
and the Future of Delaware’s Corporate Law Franchise, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
829, 837 (2013) (explaining that recent study found only 11% of contracts contain
arbitration provisions).  Even though the use of arbitration is rapidly rising, it only
represents a fraction of adjudications. See id.
14. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 523 (Roth, J., dissenting) (discussing one factor that
could account for rise in arbitration is fact that “[b]usinesses in this country and
3
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tration rates are growing internationally as well.15  For instance, London’s
Court of International Arbitration has seen a 300% increase in the num-
ber of arbitration requests over the last decade.16  The rise in the use of
arbitration can be attributed to factors such as its speed in adjudicating
disputes, its ability to keep sensitive information confidential, and the in-
crease in disputes between parties from different countries.17
With the rise in the use of arbitration, Delaware creatively attempted
to enter the arbitration market by creating a state-sponsored arbitration
program.18  Delaware has long been viewed as the preeminent destination
for incorporation in the United States.19  In fact, 51% of publicly traded
companies and 61% of Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Dela-
ware.20  One of the main reasons for this preeminence is the Delaware
Court of Chancery’s expertise in articulating the bounds of Delaware cor-
porate law.21  Although the Court of Chancery is viewed as the foremost
venue for resolving business disputes, companies are increasingly turning
to arbitration to settle their disputes.22  Consequently, Delaware created a
state-sponsored arbitration program in an effort to “preserve Delaware’s
abroad need to get commercial conflicts resolved as quickly as possible so that
commercial relations are not disrupted”).
15. See id. (describing rise in popularity of arbitrations internationally).
16. See id. (detailing rise in number of arbitrations abroad).  Arbitration has
become a key method for adjudicating “commercial disputes between businesses
located in different countries.” Id.  This is especially true with “non-U.S. compa-
nies, with no familiarity—or with too much familiarity—with the American judicial
system” that “may prefer arbitration with the rules set by the parties to lengthy and
expensive court proceedings.” Id.
17. See id. (explaining rise in arbitration).
18. See John P. DiTomo, The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Strikes
Down Delaware’s Confidential Arbitration Program, INSIGHTS: THE CORP. & SEC. L. ADVI-
SOR, Nov. 2013, at 35, available at http://www.mnat.com/assets/htmldocuments/
Insights1113_DiTomo.pdf (referring to Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration pro-
gram as clever attempt to enter ADR market).
19. See Jores Kharatian, Note, Secret Arbitration or Civil Litigation?: An Analysis of
the Delaware Arbitration Program, 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 411, 411 (2013)
(explaining that Delaware is home to many large corporations and “Justice Steele,
Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, has reiterated the prominent reason
why many corporations choose Delaware as the state of their incorporation is the
presence of highly knowledgeable judges within the business law realm, as well as
the predictability of its judicial system”).
20. See Myron T. Steele, Chief Justice, Del. Supreme Court, Keynote Address
at the Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship, & the Law Symposium: Delaware’s
Closed Door Arbitration: What the Future Holds for Large Business Disputes and
How It Will Affect M&A Deals (Oct. 30, 2012), reprinted in 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEUR-
SHIP & L. 375, 376 (illustrating Delaware’s preeminence as place of incorporation).
21. See Kharatian, supra note 19, at 411; see also LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY COR-
PORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 5 (2007), available at http://1.usa.gov/HAgIRP.
(“Many experienced lawyers believe that the principal reason to recommend to
their clients that they incorporate in Delaware is the Delaware courts and the body
of case law those courts have developed.  They point, in particular, to the national
reputation and importance of the Court of Chancery.”).
22. See Quinn, supra note 13, at 841 (“The specialized Chancery Court is one
of the sources of Delaware’s competitive advantage in corporate law.”); see also
4
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preeminence in offering cost-effective options for resolving disputes, par-
ticularly those involving commercial, corporate, and technology mat-
ters.”23  In order to qualify for Delaware’s program, “at least one party
must be a ‘business entity formed or organized’ under Delaware law and
neither party can be a ‘consumer.’”24 Additionally, the amount in contro-
versy must exceed one million dollars.25
In Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Inc. v. Strine,26 the Third Cir-
cuit declared Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration program unconstitu-
tional as a violation of the First Amendment right of public access.27  This
Casebrief identifies the Third Circuit’s application of the logic and experi-
ence test in determining the right of public access.28  Part II introduces
the right of public access and the logic and experience test.29  Addition-
ally, Part II examines Delaware’s arbitration program and the decisions of
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware and Third
Circuit regarding the constitutionality of the program.30  Part III analyzes
the Third Circuit’s conflicting approaches to the application of the logic
Strine, 733 F.3d at 523 (Roth, J., dissenting) (noting that use of arbitration is
increasing).
23. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 512 (internal quotation marks omitted) (declaring
Delaware’s motive in creating state-sponsored arbitration program); Quinn, supra
note 13, at 832 (“[I]n its pleadings before the court in the citizens’ challenge and
its public defense, Delaware regularly points to the potential threat of losing adju-
dications to arbitrators in New York, London, or Singapore as a motivation for
implementing its court-sponsored procedure.” (citing Brief for NASDAQ OMX
Group Inc. & NYSE EuroNext as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 8, Del.
Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D. Del. 2012) (No. 1:11-
1015))).  Quinn also recognized that “[t]he perceived long-term threat to Dela-
ware’s central position in the corporate law as a result of adjudications moving
overseas and elsewhere is obvious.” Id.
24. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 512 (citation omitted) (laying out qualifications to
participate in Delaware’s state sponsored arbitration program).
25. See id. (stating minimum amount in controversy needed to participate in
program).
26. 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013).
27. See id. at 521 (“Because there has been a tradition of accessibility to pro-
ceedings like Delaware’s government-sponsored arbitration, and because access
plays an important role in such proceedings, we find that there is a First Amend-
ment right of access to Delaware’s government-sponsored arbitrations.”).  For a
further discussion of the facts and procedure of Strine, see infra notes 57–90 and
accompanying text.
28. For a further discussion of the logic and experience test, see infra notes
43–49 and accompanying text.
29. For a further discussion of the right of public access, see infra notes 34–42
and accompanying text.  For a further discussion of the logic and experience test,
see infra notes 43–49 and accompanying text.
30. For a further discussion of Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration pro-
gram, see infra notes 50–56 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion of the
district court’s decision, see infra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.  For a fur-
ther discussion of the Third Circuit’s decision, see infra notes 61–97 and accompa-
nying text.
5
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and experience test.31  Further, Part III argues that the potential negative
effects on Delaware’s position as a place of incorporation may not be as
dire as some suggest.32  Finally, Part IV addresses the overall impact of the
Strine decision and its importance in the Third Circuit.33
II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLIC ACCESS: DEVELOPMENT, APPLICATION, AND THE
CONFLICT IN DELAWARE
The Supreme Court first recognized the right of public access in
1980, when it decided Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.34  In Richmond
Newspapers, the Court held that a Virginia trial court’s decision to close a
criminal trial to the public violated the First Amendment.35  In that case,
Chief Justice Burger emphasized the importance of public access in the
American judicial system when he wrote, “[t]he explicit, guaranteed rights
to speak and to publish concerning what takes place at a trial would lose
much meaning if access to observe the trial could . . . be foreclosed arbi-
trarily.”36 Since its decision in Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court
has expanded the right of public access to certain additional criminal pro-
ceedings, but it has never considered the question of whether the right is
31. For a further discussion of the conflicting applications of the logic and
experience test, see infra notes 104–28 and accompanying text.  For a further dis-
cussion of the recently filed petition for a writ of certiorari, see infra notes 129–42
and accompanying text.
32. For a further discussion of the potential effects of the Third Circuit’s deci-
sion on Delaware as a primary place of incorporation, see infra notes 143–54 and
accompanying text.
33. For a further discussion of the overall impact of Strine, see infra notes
155–59 and accompanying text.
34. See 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (finding right of public access to criminal
trials implicit in First Amendment).  For a further discussion regarding the com-
mon law development of right of public access, see supra note 8 and accompanying
text.
35. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 (holding that First Amendment
provides right of public access to criminal proceedings).  The decision in Richmond
Newspapers was a fractured one, consisting of five different opinions; however,
seven of the eight justices who participated in the decision held in favor of finding
a right of public access to criminal proceedings. See id.; id. at 583 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); id. at 585 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 599 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring); id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
36. See id. at 576–77 (plurality opinion) (detailing importance of First Amend-
ment right of public access to American judicial system).  Chief Justice Burger
traced the history of criminal trials being open to the public. See id.  After review-
ing several hundred years of records, Chief Justice Burger could not find “a single
instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal
court . . . .” See id. at 573 n.9 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948)).  In
explaining the importance of a First Amendment right of public access, Chief Jus-
tice Burger identified some of the public benefits that stem from enforcing this
right: public accountability and educating the public about the judicial system. See
id.
6
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warranted in civil proceedings.37  Although the Supreme Court has never
expressly examined the question of a right of public access to a civil pro-
ceeding, it noted in Richmond Newspapers that “historically both civil and
criminal trials have been presumptively open.”38
A. Finding the Right of Public Access in the Third Circuit
Many circuit courts, including the Third Circuit, have considered the
question of public access, and all have found a right of public access to
civil trials.39  The Third Circuit has held that this right also applies to
meetings of a Pennsylvania city planning commission and post-trial juror
examinations.40  However, the Third Circuit has declined to extend the
right of public access to certain proceedings, such as judicial disciplinary
boards, the records of state environmental agencies, and the voting pro-
cess.41  In determining whether there is a First Amendment right of public
access to a certain proceeding, the Third Circuit applies the logic and ex-
perience test.42
37. See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 2013)
(acknowledging Supreme Court has only found right of access in criminal
proceedings).
38. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17 (“Whether the public has a
right to attend trials of civil cases is a question not raised by this case, but we note
that historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open.”).  For
a further discussion regarding proceedings for which the Supreme Court has
found a right of public access applies, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th
Cir. 1988) (finding First Amendment right of public access in civil trials); FTC v.
Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 410 (1st Cir. 1987) (same); Westmore-
land v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984) (same); Pub-
licker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984) (same); In re Cont’l
Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1309 (7th Cir. 1984) (same); Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983) (same).
40. See Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Twp. of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 180–81
(3d. Cir. 1999) (finding First Amendment right of public access to meetings of city
planning commission in Pennsylvania); United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 840
(3d Cir. 1994) (finding First Amendment right of public access to post-trial juror
examinations).
41. See PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (declining to
extend First Amendment right of public access to voting process); N. Jersey Media
Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2002) (declining to extend First
Amendment right of public access to deportation hearings); First Amendment
Coal. v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 477 (3d Cir. 1999) (declining
to extend First Amendment right of public access to judicial disciplinary board
hearings); Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1175–76 (3d Cir.
1986) (declining to extend First Amendment right of public access to records of
state environmental agencies).
42. See, e.g., Strine, 733 F.3d at 514 (“In order to qualify for public access, both
experience and logic must counsel in favor of opening the proceeding to the pub-
lic” (citing N. Jersey Media Grp., 308 F.3d at 213–14)).
7
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B. Determining a Right of Public Access: The Logic and Experience Test
The logic and experience test is a two-pronged test that courts use to
determine whether there is a right of public access.43  Under the experi-
ence prong of the test, courts generally examine the history of a particular
proceeding to decide whether that proceeding has traditionally been open
to the public.44  This is an objective standard that draws “on a plethora of
historical sources . . . .”45  Put simply, if a proceeding has traditionally
been open to the public, that tradition of openness implies that a proceed-
ing will pass the experience prong of the test; however, a showing of open-
ness at common law is not always required.46
The logic prong of the test considers whether “access plays a signifi-
cant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in ques-
tion.”47  In answering this question, courts apply an objective standard and
consider two things: “the positive role of access” and “‘the extent to which
openness impairs the public good.’”48  To find that a proceeding qualifies
43. See, e.g., N. Jersey Media Grp., 308 F.3d at 202 (applying logic and experi-
ence test to determine if there is right of public access to deportation hearings).
The Third Circuit adopted the logic and experience test from Richmond Newspa-
pers, the decision where the Supreme Court first found a constitutional right of
public access. See id. (“[W]e find that the application of the Richmond Newspapers
experience and logic tests does not compel us to declare the Creppy Directive
unconstitutional.”).  In order to find a First Amendment right of public access,
both the experience and logic prongs of the test must be met. See id. at 213–14.
44. See, e.g., Press II, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986) (examining history of preliminary
proceedings in criminal trials and finding tradition of accessibility to these pro-
ceedings dating back to “the celebrated trial of Aaron Burr for treason”); see also
Strine, 733 F.3d at 515–18 (examining history of civil trials and arbitrations); N.
Jersey Media Grp., 308 F.3d at 211 (stating that court considers “whether ‘the place
and process have historically been open to the press and general public’” (quoting
Press II, 478 U.S. at 8)); Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1068 (tracing history of open-
ness of civil trials back to Statute of Marlborough in 1267).
45. See PG Publ’g, 705 F.3d at 108 (explaining how Third Circuit and Supreme
Court analyze experience prong of logic and experience test under objective stan-
dard).  These sources include “comments made by the Framers, practice at the
English court of law, congressional procedures, relevant regulatory schemes, and
court decisions.” Id.
46. See id. (“[A] tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of
experience.” (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589
(1980))); see also Strine, 733 F.3d at 515 (“In order to satisfy the experience test, the
tradition of openness must be strong; however, ‘a showing of openness at common
law is not required.’” (quoting PG Publ’g, 705 F.3d at 108)). But see N. Jersey Media
Grp., 308 F.3d at 213 (explaining that while “a 1000-year history is unnecessary” in
establishing experience prong, experience cannot be dispensed with just because
“history is ambiguous or lacking”).
47. See Press II, 478 U.S. at 8 (explaining that while some governmental pro-
ceedings “operate best under public scrutiny,” others, such as grand jury proceed-
ings, “would be totally frustrated if conducted openly”).
48. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 518 (quoting N. Jersey Media Grp., 308 F.3d at 202)
(laying out elements of logic prong of logic and experience test).  The logic prong
is also examined under an objective standard. See PG Publ’g, 705 F.3d at 111.  In
applying the logic prong, courts will examine six traditional benefits that flow from
openness. See id.  These benefits include:
8
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for the First Amendment right of public access, a court must determine
that “both experience and logic [ ] counsel in favor of opening the pro-
ceeding to the public.”49
C. Preserving Delaware’s Preeminence in the Realm of Corporate Law
In 2009, the Delaware General Assembly amended the Delaware Code
to grant sitting judges on the Court of Chancery the “power to arbitrate
business disputes.”50  The goals of Delaware’s arbitration program were
two-fold: “(1) addressing businesses’ increasing demand for alternatives to
civil litigation as a means of resolving commercial disputes, and (2) mak-
ing the state’s expert judiciary available to satisfy that demand with well-
reasoned results and savings of time and expense.”51
[1] promotion of informed discussion of governmental affairs by provid-
ing the public with the more complete understanding of the [proceed-
ing]; [2] promotion of the public perception of fairness which can be
achieved only by permitting full public view of the proceedings; [3] pro-
viding a significant community therapeutic value as an outlet for commu-
nity concern, hostility and emotion; [4] serving as a check on corrupt
practices by exposing the [proceeding] to public scrutiny; [5] enhance-
ment of the performance of all involved; and [6] discouragement of
[fraud].
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 839 (3d
Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 514 (citing N. Jersey Media Grp., 308 F.3d at 213–14)
(indicating that both prongs of logic and experience test must be met for proceed-
ing to qualify for First Amendment right of public access).  Once a presumption of
public access is given to a proceeding on the basis of the experience and logic test,
the right of public access can only be overturned by a compelling state interest. See
Press II, 478 U.S. at 9–10 (explaining right of public access is not absolute but
rather “[t]he presumption may be overcome only by an overriding interest based
on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tai-
lored to serve that interest.  The interest is to be articulated along with findings
specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order
was properly entered.” (quoting Press I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
50. See H.B. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2009) (resulting in Court of Chan-
cery arbitration program outlined in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349 (2009)); see also
Steele, supra note 20, at 376 (clarifying that Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration
program was created by statute and not court rule).  Additionally, Chief Justice
Steele explained that the District Court’s opinion gave the impression that the
program was a court rule and not created by statute. See id.
51. See DiTomo, supra note 18, at 31 (citing H.B. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb.
(Del. 2009)) (stating goals of Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration program).  In
order to qualify for Delaware’s arbitration program, parties must meet three condi-
tions: (1) at least one party must be a Delaware corporation; (2) neither party can
be a consumer; and (3) the amount-in-controversy must be at least one million
dollars. Id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349); see also Steele, supra note 20, at
376 (explaining that purpose of Delaware’s program was to provide service “to our
constituents, our customers, in addition to the regular court system”).  Chief Jus-
tice Steele further explained that the program is an advantage offered to corpora-
tions who are either incorporated in or have their principle place of business in
Delaware. See id.
9
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Under the program, the judges sitting on the Court of Chancery
would hear arbitration proceedings during normal business hours.52
However, unlike normal Chancery Court proceedings, these arbitrations
would be closed to the public.53  Court of Chancery rules governed arbi-
trations for the purposes of depositions and discovery, and the judge
could “grant any remedy or relief that [the judge] deem[ed] just and equi-
table and within the scope of any applicable agreement of the parties.”54
Ultimately, the confidentiality of the program caused the District Court
and the Third Circuit to declare the arbitration program unconstitu-
tional.55  While it is true that privacy is an important component of the
arbitration process, critics argued that this alleged need for confidentiality
did not weigh heavily against the longstanding tradition of openness,
which is at the heart of the First Amendment right of public access.56
D. Civil Trial or Arbitration?  A Dilemma in the District Court
The Delaware Coalition for Open Government (the Coalition)
brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Dela-
ware, alleging that the confidentiality of Delaware’s arbitration program
52. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 512–13 (describing procedure of Delaware’s arbitra-
tion program).  Before an arbitration proceeding is heard, the parties are required
to file a petition with the Register in Chancery. See id. at 512.  Arbitrations typically
begin ninety days after the Register in Chancery has been petitioned, and they cost
$6,000 per day after an initial $12,000 filing fee. See id. at 513.  Additionally, arbi-
trations are governed by the rules of the Court of Chancery unless the parties
agree otherwise. See id.  The presiding judge “[m]ay grant any remedy or relief
that [s/he] deems just and equitable and within the scope of any applicable agree-
ment of the parties” and both parties have the right to appeal the decision to the
Delaware Supreme Court. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting DEL. CH. R.
98(f)(1)).  However, the chances of overruling decisions made by the arbitrator
are limited because, on appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court applies a set of stan-
dards outlined in the Federal Arbitration Act that are highly deferential to the
lower court’s arbitration decision. See id.  One situation where the Delaware Su-
preme Court may disagree with the arbitrator’s decision is if the appellant shows
that the “award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means” or there was
misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012)).
Without proof of some sort of misconduct on the part of the arbitrator, there are
very few circumstances in which an arbitration decision will be overturned on ap-
peal. See id.
53. See id. at 513 (“[T]he statute and rules governing Delaware’s proceedings
bar public access.”).
54. See id. (quoting DEL. CH. R. 98(f)(1)) (explaining procedure for arbitra-
tion program).  Although depositions and discovery were to be governed by Court
of Chancery rules generally, parties could amend how the rules would apply. See
id.
55. See id. at 521 (declaring Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration program
unconstitutional as violation of First Amendment right of public access).
56. See Quinn, supra note 13, at 848 (“[T]he provision for the broad protec-
tions of confidentiality for the arbitration proceedings places it squarely at odds
with long-held notions of openness of court proceedings and a qualified First
Amendment right of public access to the courts.”).
10
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violated the First Amendment right of public access.57  The Coalition ar-
gued that these secret arbitrations were more akin to civil trials than arbi-
trations.58  The court agreed and found that “the Delaware proceeding
functions essentially as a non-jury trial before a Chancery Court judge,”
and, therefore, the First Amendment right of public access applied to
these proceedings.59  The district court did not apply the logic and experi-
ence test because it found that Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration pro-
gram was “sufficiently like a trial,” and therefore, the right of public access
automatically applied.60
E. Letting the Secret Out: The Third Circuit Gets the Case
On appeal, the Third Circuit found that the district court erred in not
applying the logic and experience test.61  Although the Third Circuit rec-
ognized that there were similarities between civil trials and Delaware’s ar-
bitration program, these parallels were not enough to bypass the logic and
experience test.62  Therefore, the Third Circuit proceeded to examine
57. See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 494 (D. Del.
2012) (arguing that First Amendment right of public access bars defendants from
excluding public and press from private arbitrations).
58. See id. at 500 (“[T]he Delaware proceeding is essentially a bench trial and
Publicker Industries governs the state’s ability to close the proceeding to the
public.”).
59. See id. at 494 (finding Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration program suf-
ficiently like trial to apply First Amendment right of public access).  In finding a
First Amendment right of public access, the court decided that although it was
called an arbitration, Delaware’s proceeding was essentially a civil trial. See id. at
502.
60. See id. at 500–03 (determining Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration pro-
gram is essentially civil trial and therefore court did not need to apply logic and
experience test).  In deciding whether to apply the logic and experience test, the
district court determined that it needed to address a threshold question: “Has Del-
aware implemented a form of commercial arbitration to which the Court must
apply the logic and experience test, or has it created a procedure ‘sufficiently like a
trial’, such that Publicker Industries governs?” Id. at 500 (citing El Vocero de P.R.
(Caribbean Int’l News Corp.) v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 149–50 (1993)).  After
examining Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration program, the court determined
that “[t]he Delaware proceeding, although bearing the label arbitration, is essen-
tially a civil trial.” Id. at 502.  Because the court found the arbitration proceeding
was, in effect, a civil trial, there was no need to apply the logic and experience test.
See id. at 503–04.
61. See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 515 (3d Cir. 2013)
(“We find the District Court’s reliance on El Vocero misplaced and its decision to
bypass the experience and logic test inappropriate.”).  The Third Circuit recog-
nized similarities between civil trials and Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration
program, but it found that these were not enough to justify skipping the logic and
experience test. See id.
62. See id. at 514–15 (finding similarities between civil trials and Delaware’s
state-sponsored arbitration program, but not enough to find program “sufficiently
like a trial” in order to skip logic and experience test (quoting Strine, 894 F. Supp.
2d at 500)).
11
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Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration program under the logic and expe-
rience test.63
1. Experience Prong: An Examination of History
In applying the experience prong, the court needed to decide which
proceeding’s history to examine: civil trials or arbitrations.64  The Coali-
tion argued that only the history of civil trials should be examined,
whereas the Appellants argued that only the history of arbitrations should
be examined.65  The Third Circuit did not agree with either party.66
Rather, the court explained that it need not “engage in so narrow a histor-
ical inquiry,” and instead, it would examine the history of both civil trials
and arbitrations.67
a. Civil Trials: A Long History of Openness
The Strine court began its analysis by noting that, “there is a long his-
tory of [public] access to civil trials.”68  It then traced the history of open-
ness in civil trials through English common law, beginning with the
passage of the Statute of Marlborough in 1267.69  Next, the court pro-
ceeded to explain that American colonists adopted the tradition of open-
ness and that courthouses played a central role in colonial life.70  Finally,
the court concluded its analysis of the history of civil trials by noting that
civil trials generally remain open to the public today.71
63. See id. at 515 (“We therefore must examine Delaware’s proceeding under
the experience and logic test.”).
64. See id. (noting that parties in this case disagreed about which proceedings’
history Third Circuit should examine in order to decide experience prong of expe-
rience and logic test).
65. See id. (“The Appellants suggest that we only examine the history of arbi-
trations, whereas the Coalition suggests we only examine the history of civil
trials.”).
66. See id. (concluding that “[n]either suggestion is appropriate in isolation”).
67. See id. (“There is no need to engage in so narrow a historical inquiry as
the parties suggest.  In determining the bounds of our historical inquiry, we look
‘not to the practice of the specific public institution involved, but rather to
whether the particular type of government proceeding [has] historically been open
in our free society.’” (alteration in original) (quoting PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele,
705 F.3d 91, 108 (3d Cir. 2013))).  In “[f]ollowing this broad historical approach,”
the court found “that an exploration of both civil trials and arbitration [was] ap-
propriate . . . .” Id. at 516.
68. See id. (citing Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1068–70 (3d.
Cir. 1984)) (noting that Third Circuit has previously explained long history of civil
trials in Publicker).
69. See id. (explaining Statute of Marlborough required “all Causes . . . to be
heard, ordered, and determined before the Judges of the King’s Courts [were to
be heard] openly in the King’s Courts” (alterations in original) (quoting COKE,
supra note 8)).
70. See id. (citing Spaulding, supra note 8, at 318–19) (discussing how court-
houses served as central place in colonial life).
71. See id. (“Today, civil trials and the court filings associated with them are
generally open to the public.”).
12
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b. Arbitrations: A Mixed History
In examining the history of arbitrations, the Third Circuit once again
began its analysis with the English common law, finding records of arbitra-
tions in England dating back to the twelfth century.72  These records sug-
gest that arbitrations were held in public and involved community
participation.73  The court went on to explain that, beginning in colonial
times and continuing throughout the eighteenth century, arbitration in
the United States began to develop formal procedures and that at least
some of these arbitrations were public.74
Despite this development, the court explained that it was not until the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 that arbitrations became an important tool
in resolving commercial disputes.75  Today, there is an entire industry de-
voted to arbitrations, and these arbitrations are “distinctly private” because
“[c]onfidentiality is a natural outgrowth of the status of arbitrations as pri-
vate alternatives to government-sponsored proceedings.”76  Thus, the
court determined that the history of arbitrations contains a combination
of privacy and openness.77  After its analysis, the court found that Dela-
ware’s program met the experience prong of the test.78  According to the
court, Delaware’s program, “a binding arbitration before a judge that
takes place in a courtroom,” was similar to proceedings that have a strong
tradition of openness.79
72. See id. (citing 1 MARTIN DOMKE ET AL., DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION § 2:5 (3d ed. 2011)) (detailing history of arbitration).
73. See id. at 517 (“Early arbitrations involved community participation, and
evidence suggests that they took place in public venues.”).
74. See id. (recounting development of arbitration in America from colonial
time to eighteenth century).  The court noted that in colonial times, arbitrations
served mainly as a tool for those who were suspicious of the legal system and
wanted to solve disputes in a “‘less public and less adversarial’ way.” Id. (citing
JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW?: RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LAW-
YERS 4 (1983); Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before
the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 454 (1984)).  In addition, the court
noted that by the eighteenth century, despite the fact that arbitrations had become
more formal, at least some continued to take place in public. See id.
75. See id. (recognizing that passage of Federal Arbitration Act in 1925, along
with New York’s Arbitration Act in 1920, which first treated arbitration agreements
as contracts, allowed arbitration to evolve into tool it is today).
76. See id. at 517–18 (explaining that groups such as the American Arbitration
Association set up and facilitate private arbitrations).
77. See id. at 518 (noting that there is mixed history with regards to openness
of arbitrations but “they have often been closed, especially in the twentieth
century”).
78. See id. (finding Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration program “dif-
fer[ed] fundamentally” from traditional arbitrations and that this type of proceed-
ing does not qualify for protection from First Amendment right of public access).
79. See id. (finding proceedings similar to Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitra-
tion program have traditionally been open to public).  The court found that “the
history of openness is comparable to the history that this court described in Pub-
licker.” Id.  Thus, the court relied on the history in Publicker to find a right of public
access to civil trials. See generally id. at 516–18 (citing Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Co-
13
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2. The Logic Prong: Weighing the Benefits and Disadvantages of Openness
After finding that Delaware’s proceeding met the experience prong,
the Third Circuit applied the logic prong of the test.80  When applying the
logic prong, a court must decide whether “access plays a significant posi-
tive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.”81  In
doing so, the Third Circuit weighed both the positive and negative roles
that openness would play in Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration
program.82
The Third Circuit has recognized six main benefits of public access.83
These benefits include: keeping citizens informed, maintaining the fair-
ness that accompanies open proceedings, providing an outlet for commu-
nity concern, allowing public scrutiny, enhancing the performance of
those involved in the judicial process, and discouraging fraud or misrepre-
sentation.84  The Third Circuit concluded that opening Delaware’s arbi-
tration program to the public would serve the same benefits.85  According
to the court, an open proceeding would give stockholders and the public a
better understanding of Delaware’s dispute resolution methods, “allay the
public’s concerns” over the process, expose parties and the court to scru-
tiny, and discourage perjury and misrepresentation.86
Weighed against these benefits, the court found the detriments of
open arbitrations to be “slight.”87  Appellants argued that privacy is neces-
sary to protect “patented information, trade secrets, and other closely held
information,” to “prevent the loss of prestige and good will” that would
follow an open proceeding, and to curb the hostility that often accompa-
nies open proceedings.88  Additionally, Appellants argued that openness
hen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding First Amendment right of public
access in civil trials)).
80. See id. at 518 (applying logic prong of logic and experience test).
81. See id. (quoting Press II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (explaining logic prong of logic and experience test).
82. See id. at 518–19 (quoting N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d
198, 202 (3d Cir. 2002)) (defining considerations at play in logic prong).
83. See id. at 519 (listing six benefits of openness considered by Third Cir-
cuit).  For a list of the six factors weighed by the Third Circuit in determining the
logic prong of the logic and experience test, see supra note 48.
84. See id. (asserting that all six benefits of public access would be furthered if
First Amendment right of public access applied to Delaware’s state-sponsored arbi-
tration program).
85. See id. (discussing benefits of applying right of public access to Delaware’s
state-sponsored arbitration program).
86. See id. (determining that benefits of opening Delaware’s proceeding to
public “weigh strongly in favor of granting access to Delaware’s arbitration
proceedings”).
87. See id. (“The benefits of openness weigh strongly in favor of granting ac-
cess to Delaware’s arbitration proceedings.  In comparison, the drawbacks of open-
ness that Appellants cite are relatively slight.”).
88. See id. at 519–20 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 60, Del. Coal. for Open
Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-3859)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (listing Appellant’s arguments in favor of privacy and explain-
14
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would effectively end the arbitration program.89  Despite Appellants’ argu-
ments, the court did not find these interests compelling and held that the
logic prong weighed in favor of a right of public access.90
F. Disagreement Among the Judges: The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Roth issued a strong dissenting opinion in Strine.91  She took
exception to the majority’s application of the logic and experience test
because it examined the history of both civil trials and arbitrations.92  In-
stead, Judge Roth examined only the history of arbitrations.93  She ex-
ing why those benefits would be slight).  The court rebuffed each argument put
forth by Appellants in favor of privacy. See id. at 519.  The court disagreed that
privacy was necessary to protect “patented information, trade secrets, and other
closely held information” because that information is “already protected under
Delaware Chancery Court Rule 5.1 . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
With regard to the potential loss of goodwill and prestige that parties would suffer,
the court responded that it “would not hinder the functioning of the proceeding.”
Id.  Appellants further argued that privacy encourages a “less hostile, more concili-
atory approach,” however, the court noted that private arbitrations can become
“contentious” as well. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Lastly, Appellants
argued that openness would end Delaware’s arbitration program. See id. at 520.
The court found that, if true, Delaware’s arbitrations were akin to civil trials and
created to “contravene the First Amendment right of access.” See id.
89. See id. (“This argument assumes that confidentiality is the sole advantage
of Delaware’s proceeding over regular Chancery Court proceedings.  But if that
were true—if Delaware’s arbitration were just a secret civil trial—it would clearly
contravene the First Amendment right of access.”).
90. See id. at 521 (“Like history, logic weighs in favor of granting access to
Delaware’s government-sponsored arbitration proceedings.  The benefits of access
are significant.  It would ensure accountability and allow the public to maintain
faith in the Delaware judicial system.  A possible decrease in the appeal of the
proceeding and a reduction in its conciliatory potential are comparatively less
weighty, and they fall far short of the ‘profound’ security concerns we found com-
pelling in North Jersey Media Group.”).
91. See id. at 523 (Roth, J., dissenting) (focusing solely on issue of
confidentiality).
92. See id. at 524–26 (disagreeing with majority’s decision to examine history
of both civil trials and arbitrations).  Judge Roth argued that the majority erred in
looking “not to the practice of the specific public institution involved, but rather to
whether the particular type of government proceeding [has] historically been
open . . . .” Id. at 524 (first alteration in original) (quoting Strine, 733 F.3d at 515
(majority opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Further, she opined that
the majority’s analysis, which classifies Delaware’s program as a “particular type of
government proceeding” that has traditionally been open to the public, “begs the
question.” Id. at 525 (quoting Strine, 733 F.3d at 515 (majority opinion)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
93. See id. at 523–26 (examining history of arbitrations only).  In examining
the history of arbitrations, Judge Roth found that there was a strong tradition of
privacy and confidentiality in arbitrations that began in England, continued
through the founding of the United States, and remained to today. See id. at 525.
Thus, she did not find a tradition of openness for arbitrations. See id. at 525–26.
Additionally, under the logic prong, she found that “the resolution of complex
business disputes, involving sensitive financial information, trade secrets, and tech-
nological developments, needs to be confidential so that the parties do not suffer
the ill effects of this information being set out for the public . . . .” Id. at 526.
15
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plained that arbitrations in England and the American colonies were
private and that confidentiality in arbitration proceedings continues to-
day.94  Additionally, she noted that “the major national and international
arbitral bodies continue to emphasize confidentiality.”95  Consequently,
Judge Roth concluded that arbitrations have historically been held in pri-
vate and therefore lacked the tradition of openness needed to satisfy the
experience prong.96
Finally, in examining the logic prong, she found that the “resolution
of complex business disputes, involving sensitive financial information,
trade secrets, and technological developments, needs to be confiden-
tial . . . .”97  Therefore, under Judge Roth’s application of the logic and
experience test, Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration program does not
violate the right of public access and should be upheld.
III. ANALYSIS
The Third Circuit’s decision in Strine forced two issues to the fore-
front: the application of the logic and experience test and the decision’s
impact on Delaware’s position as a destination for incorporation.98  First,
Strine evidences the contrasting applications of the logic and experience
test—that mirror a division among the circuit courts—and provides an
intriguing forum in which to examine these two approaches.99  Second,
Therefore, Judge Roth concluded that the arbitration program should remain pri-
vate. See id.
94. See id. at 525–26 (citing Michael Collins, Privacy and Confidentiality in Arbi-
tration Proceedings, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 121, 122 (1995)) (explaining that arbitrations
in England and American colonies focused on privacy).  Judge Roth also noted
that during the twentieth century “arbitration bodies began to develop rules for
arbitration proceedings that emphasize privacy and confidentiality.” Id. (citing
Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth, 54 U. KAN. L. REV.
1255, 1271–72 (2006)).
95. See id. (citing AAA & ABA, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMER-
CIAL DISPUTES, Canon VI(B) (2004); AAA, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES R-23
(2009); UNCITRAL, ARBITRATION RULES art. 21(3) (2010)) (emphasizing that con-
fidentiality is key to arbitration today and that arbitrations are not held in public
unless parties agree).
96. See id. at 526 (concluding that arbitrations have not traditionally been
open to public and press).
97. See id. (determining that confidentiality is essential to prevent third par-
ties from obtaining and misappropriating confidential information needed to arbi-
trate disputes).
98. For a further discussion of the application of the logic and experience
test, see infra notes 101–42 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion of the
decision’s impact on Delaware’s position as a destination for incorporation, see
infra notes 143–54 and accompanying text.
99. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 19–21, Strine v. Del. Coal. for Open
Gov’t, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014) (No. 13-869), 2014 WL 262086 (explaining differing
applications of logic and experience test and division among circuits).  The Peti-
tion notes two main applications of the logic and experience test. See id.  The main
applications are demonstrated in Strine, with the majority adopting a more lenient
approach and the dissent adopting a more stringent approach. Compare Strine, 733
16
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Delaware’s position as a destination of incorporation has been at the fore-
front of Delaware’s arguments throughout litigation; however, some com-
mentators have stated strong disagreements with this position.100
A. Conflicting Applications of the Logic and Experience Test
The correct application of the experience prong of the logic and ex-
perience test is a point of contention among the circuits and some state
supreme courts.101  The issue arises over the degree of strictness, or leni-
ency, courts use in applying a historical analysis.102  These different appli-
cations can produce opposite results, as was displayed in Strine, where the
majority adopted the more lenient approach and the dissent the stricter
approach.103
1. Contrasting Approaches Create Headaches for Practitioners in the Third
Circuit
There are two main applications of the experience prong of the
test.104  First, some courts require “a long and unbroken history of open-
ness,” whereas other courts allow for a much more lenient historical show-
ing.105  The stricter version of the test, which requires a “long and
unbroken history of openness,” seems to more closely resemble the test
promulgated in Richmond Newspapers, in which the Supreme Court first
F.3d at 515–18 (applying lenient approach), with id. at 523–26 (Roth, J., dissent-
ing) (applying strict approach).  Because these two applications are used in Strine,
it provides a unique chance to examine the relative advantages and disadvantages
of both approaches by comparing their application to the same issue.
100. For a further discussion of Delaware’s insistence that its arbitration pro-
gram is necessary to preserve its preeminence as the destination for incorporation,
and the disagreement of certain commentators, see infra notes 143–54 and accom-
panying text.
101. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 99, at 19 (“Beyond the tradi-
tional criminal or civil trial—and the ‘unbroken, uncontradicted history’ of public
access to those proceedings—the lower courts disagree sharply on the historical
showing needed to satisfy the experience standard.” (citation omitted) (quoting
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980))). But see Brief
for Respondent Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Inc. in Opposition at
14, Strine v. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014) (No. 13-869), 2014
WL 547054 (arguing there is no circuit split regarding application of logic and
experience test).
102. For a further discussion of the divergent applications of the logic and
experience test, see infra notes 104–28 and accompanying text.
103. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 515 (applying lenient standard). But see id. at 518
(Roth, J., dissenting) (applying strict standard).
104. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 99, at 19–20 (explaining
applications of test).  There is a third application in which some courts uphold
First Amendment claims “notwithstanding the absence of any tradition of open-
ness.” See id. at 20–21.  That approach has only been applied in the Second Circuit
and will not be discussed in this Casebrief.
105. See id. at 19 (explaining two main applications of test that circuits are
split over).
17
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recognized the right of public access.106  It is also the approach taken by
Judge Roth in her dissenting opinion in Strine.107  Additionally, the Sev-
enth Circuit, D.C. Circuit, and the state of Massachusetts have adopted this
stricter approach.108
The second approach to the experience prong is the approach ap-
plied by the majority in Strine.109  The First, Third, and Sixth Circuits have
also applied this approach.110  Compared to the first approach, this ap-
proach is much more lenient because it allows for a more ambiguous
showing of openness than the first approach.111  Additionally, this ap-
proach allows courts to analogize the particular proceeding at issue to
other proceedings with clear histories of openness in order to find a right
of public access, thereby increasing the number of proceedings that qual-
ify for the right of public access.112
The majority and dissenting opinions in Strine provide an intriguing
forum to examine how these two different approaches treat the same is-
sue.113  The majority in Strine found that there was “a strong tradition of
openness for proceedings like Delaware’s government-sponsored arbitra-
106. See id. at 17–18 (arguing that lenient approach is not consistent with test
derived from Richmond Newspapers).
107. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 523–25 (Roth, J., dissenting) (analyzing history of
arbitration only).  Judge Roth argued that the majority’s analysis, finding that Dela-
ware’s program is the “particular type of government proceeding” that has histori-
cally been held open, “begs the question.” Id. at 524–25.
108. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 99, at 19 (indicating
which courts have applied this approach to logic and experience test).  It also ap-
pears that the Third Circuit applied this approach in a previous case to hold that
there was not a right of public access to deportation hearings. See  N. Jersey Media
Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 221 (3d Cir. 2002).  For a further discussion of
this case, see infra notes 125–27 and accompanying text.
109. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 515–18 (applying more lenient approach to experi-
ence prong by examining history of both civil trials and arbitrations).
110. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 99, at 20 (listing circuits
that apply more lenient approach).
111. See id. at 19–20 (contrasting applications of test).  The first application
requires a “long and unbroken history,” whereas the second approach allows for a
much more ambiguous showing, such as allowing courts to analogize to other pro-
ceedings. See id.
112. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 515–18 (analogizing Delaware’s state-sponsored ar-
bitration program to histories of both civil trials and arbitrations and finding
“[w]hen we properly account for the type of proceeding that Delaware has insti-
tuted—a binding arbitration before a judge that takes place in a courtroom—the
history of openness is comparable to the history that this court described in Pub-
licker and the Supreme Court found in Richmond Newspapers”); see also In re Boston
Herald, Inc., 321 F.3d 174, 184 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining that tradition should
not be construed narrowly and that court can analogize to similar proceedings);
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 702 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding right of
access to deportation hearings by analogizing them to “judicial proceeding[s]”).
113. For a further analysis of the divergent applications of the test as dis-
played by Strine, see infra notes 114–28 and accompanying text.
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tions.”114  The majority’s decision not to explicitly classify the proceed-
ing—either as a civil trial or arbitration—highlights a significant
advantage of using the lenient approach.115  Under the lenient approach,
the classification of a specific proceeding is not of paramount impor-
tance.116  Accordingly, the lenient approach allowed the majority to con-
clude that the Delaware program shared elements of both civil trials and
arbitrations and to examine the history of both.117  Like the majority in
Strine, courts benefit from applying the lenient approach because it allows
courts to analogize the matter at hand to another proceeding’s history
when the proceeding at issue has no identifiable history.118
Conversely, Judge Roth, in her dissent, examined Delaware’s program
against the history of arbitrations only.119  The application used by Judge
114. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 521 (concluding logic and experience test counsels
in favor of finding First Amendment right of public access, because proceedings
similar to Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration program have historically been
open to public and press).  Despite this conclusion, the court did not give a clear
indication regarding whether it considered Delaware’s state-sponsored program to
be a civil trial or an arbitration. See id.  Rather, it noted that the program shared
features with both civil trials and arbitrations. See id. at 518.  The court seemed to
imply, however, that Delaware’s program is more like a civil trial than an arbitra-
tion in two respects. See id.  First, the court conceded that most arbitrations are
held in private. See id.  Second, it distinguished Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitra-
tion program from traditional arbitrations by comparing the state-sponsored arbi-
tration’s features to those of traditional civil trials. See id.  The court did not feel
the need to expressly classify the program as a civil trial or arbitration because “in
prior public access cases we have defined the type of proceeding broadly, and have
often found ‘wide-ranging’ historical inquiries helpful to our analysis of the First
Amendment right of public access.” Id. at 515 (citing PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele,
705 F.3d 91, 108 (3d Cir. 2013)).
115. See id. (choosing not to classify Delaware’s program as either arbitration
or civil trial).  This highlights the flexibility of this approach, allowing courts to
take the proceeding at issue and analogize it to other proceedings as the court did
in Strine.
116. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 99, at 19–21 (explaining
that lenient approach allows courts to analogize to other proceedings).  The classi-
fication is not paramount in these proceedings, because courts are not confined by
the history of a single proceeding, as they are able to analogize to similar proceed-
ings. See id.
117. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 515 (declining to examine either proceeding in
isolation).
118. See, e.g., id. (“Following this broad historical approach, we find that an
exploration of both civil trials and arbitrations is appropriate here.  Exploring both
histories avoids begging the question and allows us to fully consider the ‘judgment
of experience.’” (quoting Press II, 478 U.S. 1, 11 (1986))).
119. See id. at 524–25 (Roth, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority’s analy-
sis because Judge Roth did not examine practice of specific institution but rather
whether particular type of proceeding has history of openness).  The application
of the test by the majority is strongly contrasted by Judge Roth’s application in her
dissent. See id.  In her dissent, Judge Roth strongly disagreed with the analysis put
forth by Judge Sloviter in the majority opinion, stating that “[i]n my view, [Judge
Sloviter’s] analysis begs the question.” Id. at 525.
19
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Roth is stricter than that of the majority.120  This approach requires courts
to make a choice about a proceeding’s explicit classification.121  In doing
so, this approach is more predictable and makes it easier for attorneys and
judges to recognize which proceedings have a concrete history of open-
ness and which ones do not.122  Nevertheless, the question remains as to
how to correctly classify a proceeding.123
The application of the logic and experience test in Strine presents a
problem for practitioners in the Third Circuit.124  Not only do Strine’s ma-
jority and dissenting opinions apply different applications of the test, but
the Third Circuit as a whole appears to waver on which application of the
test to apply.125  While the court in Strine applied a more lenient historical
120. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 99, at 19–20 (explaining
strict approach requires “long and unbroken history of openness,” whereas lenient
approach “holds a much more ambiguous historical showing sufficient”).
121. See id. at 19 (explaining that this approach requires “long and unbroken
history of openness”).  Because this approach requires the proceeding to have a
“long and unbroken history,” courts cannot find a right of access by analogizing it
to other proceedings. See id.
122. See, e.g., In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325,
1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that “we cannot discern an historic practice of such
clarity, generality and duration as to justify” First Amendment right of public ac-
cess to sealed discovery documents). But see, e.g., Strine, 733 F.3d at 515–18 (analo-
gizing Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration program to history of civil trials in
order to find right of public access).  This approach is easier to predict because it
does not allow judges to analogize to the history of another proceeding; rather,
judges are forced to examine solely the history of the proceeding in front of them.
See, e.g., In re Reporters, 773 F.2d at 1336 (confining historical analysis to one type of
proceeding only).
123. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 515 (questioning whether Delaware’s proceeding
was actually arbitration).  In her dissenting opinion, Judge Roth assumed that Del-
aware’s proceedings actually were arbitrations. See id. at 525 (Roth, J., dissenting).
The majority acknowledged this issue when it noted that it could not take Dela-
ware’s designation at face value, otherwise a government could prevent access to a
proceeding simply by renaming a civil trial a “sivel trial.” See id. at 515 (majority
opinion).  The Supreme Court of the United States has held that “the First
Amendment question cannot be resolved solely on the label we give the event, i.e.,
‘trial’ or otherwise . . . .” Press II, 478 U.S. at 7.
124. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 515–18 (applying experience prong leniently to
find right of public access). But see N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d
198, 211 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he tradition of open deportation hearings is too re-
cent and inconsistent to support a First Amendment right of access.”).
125. See PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (applying
lenient standard). But see N. Jersey Media Grp., 308 F.3d at 211 (applying strict stan-
dard).  For in-depth treatment of the strict standard applied in N. Jersey Media Grp.
and how it compares to a more lenient application, see Donna Mackenzie, Note,
Do Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors?  The Third and Sixth Circuits Split over the Clo-
sure of Removal Hearings, 49 WAYNE L. REV. 813 (2003).  Mackenzie explains that the
Sixth Circuit found a right of public access to deportation hearings. See id. at 820.
In doing so, the Sixth Circuit found that a “brief historical tradition might be suffi-
cient to establish a First Amendment right of access where the beneficial effects of
access to that process are overwhelming and uncontradicted.” Id. (quoting Detroit
Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 701 (6th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).  Additionally, the court relied on “acts enacted by the Immigra-
20
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analysis, the Third Circuit appeared to apply a much stricter analysis in
North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft,126 where it found there was not a
right of public access to deportation hearings.127  In using both applica-
tions of the test, the Third Circuit has left practitioners to play a guessing
game to determine which types of proceedings must remain open to the
public and which ones can remain private.128
2. Unresolved Issues: Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
On January 21, 2014, then-Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr. and the other
judges of the Delaware Court of Chancery petitioned the Supreme Court
for a Writ of Certiorari regarding the outcome in Strine.129  The main
question presented was whether the logic and experience test rendered
Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration program unconstitutional.130
The judges argued that the Strine majority erred in finding that Dela-
ware’s program met the experience prong because there was a mixed tradi-
tion of openness.131  The judges asserted that in order to hold a
tion and Naturalization Service in arriving at its decision.” See id.  Accordingly, this
application is an example of the lenient standard: enabling the court to look
outside the history of deportation hearings and to examine Immigration and Natu-
ralization acts in general. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 99, at 20
(explaining lenient standard allows courts to analogize).  On the other hand, the
Third Circuit found that deportation hearings were “too recent and inconsistent to
support a First Amendment right of access,” and were not comparable to the “un-
broken, uncontradicted history of the right of access to criminal trials.” See Mac-
kenzie, supra, at 822–23 (quoting N. Jersey Media Grp., 308 F.3d at 212–13) (internal
quotation marks omitted). This application is an example of the strict standard.
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 99, at 19 (explaining strict standard
does not allow courts to analogize).
126. 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
127. See id. at 211 (“[T]he tradition of open deportation hearings is too re-
cent and inconsistent to support a First Amendment right of access.”). But see De-
troit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 702 (finding right of public access to deportation
hearings by analogizing them to “judicial proceeding[s]”).
128. For a further discussion of the applications of the logic and experience
test used in the Third Circuit, see supra notes 43–49 and accompanying text.
129. See Matt Chiappardi, Strine Asks High Court to Take Up ‘Secret’ Arbitration
Case, LAW360.COM (Jan. 22, 2014, 3:17 PM), http://www.law360.com.articles/
strine-asks-high-court-to-take-up-secret-arbitration-case.
130. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 99, at 19–21 (arguing that
Third Circuit erred in finding that First Amendment required Delaware’s state-
sponsored arbitration program be struck down).
131. See id. at 17 (“The majority below invalidated Delaware’s statute by apply-
ing a legal standard that squarely conflicts with the principle employed by other
courts—finding that the ‘experience’ test is satisfied by what the majority itself
admitted was at most a ‘mixed’ tradition regarding public access . . . .”).  The
judges supported their position by arguing three points.  First: “There Is No Con-
stitutional Right Of Access To State Arbitration Proceedings—Even When A Judge
Serves As The Arbitrator.” Id. at 23–29.  Additionally, the judges noted that: “Arbi-
tration Lacks The Long Tradition Of Public Access Needed To Satisfy The Experi-
ence Requirement.” Id.  Finally, they argued that: “Mandating Public Access
Would Effectively Nullify Delaware’s Arbitration Process.” Id. at 30–32.
21
Shauger: Secret's Out: Third Circuit Find Delaware's State Sponsored Arbit
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-5\VLR505.txt unknown Seq: 22 23-OCT-14 8:03
898 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 877
proceeding unconstitutional under the logic and experience test, a court
must show a long tradition of openness.132  If the majority in Strine had
applied the strict approach instead of the more lenient approach, then the
First Amendment claim would have been rejected.133
The different applications of the logic and experience test create in-
consistent results, as some states have adopted the lenient approach and
others have adopted the strict approach.134  For example, it appears that a
state like Massachusetts would have come to the opposite conclusion as
the Strine court and would have upheld an arbitration program if it were
identical to Delaware’s program.135
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the right of public access is
scarce.136  Further, the Supreme Court has never ventured outside the
scope of criminal proceedings when examining the right of public ac-
cess.137  This scarcity of jurisprudence is one of the main reasons for the
divergent applications of the logic and experience test described above.138
The judges, in their Petition, argued that the Supreme Court should
take the same conservative approach to civil proceedings as it did with
criminal proceedings.139  They argued that the Third Circuit’s application
of the logic and experience test in Strine is inconsistent with the test origi-
132. See id. at 17–18 (arguing that court should have applied standard that
requires “long and unbroken history” of openness).
133. See id. at 20 (explaining that if strict standard had been applied, then
First Amendment claim would have been rejected).
134. See id. at 22 (requesting Court “grant review to clarify the historical show-
ing necessary to satisfy the ‘experience’ prong of the First Amendment right-of-
access standard, so that whether a right is recognized does not depend on which
State’s statute is at issue”).
135. See id. at 20 (noting that, due to interpretation of law in Massachusetts or
Illinois, if those states had enacted identical statute to Delaware’s, then it would
not have been struck down).
136. But see, e.g., El Vocero de P.R. (Caribbean Int’l News Corp.) v. Puerto
Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 149–50 (1993) (finding right of public access to preliminary
criminal proceedings as conducted in Puerto Rico); Press II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
(finding right of public access to preliminary criminal proceedings as conducted
in California); Press I, 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984) (finding right of public access to
voir dire of jurors in criminal trials); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555, 556–57 (1980) (finding right of public access to criminal trials).  These
are the only cases in which the United States Supreme Court has addressed the
issue of the right of public access to proceedings. See Petition for a Writ of Certio-
rari, supra note 99, at 4 (explaining that Supreme Court has not “addressed the
First Amendment right of access in the twenty years since El Vocero—and has never
addressed the application of that principle to any non-criminal proceeding”).
137. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 99, at 4 (explaining Court
has never addressed right of public access in non-criminal proceedings).
138. See id. at 19 (explaining that lower courts “disagree sharply” on what is
needed to satisfy right of public access outside of “traditional criminal or civil
trial[s]”).
139. See id. at 18–19 (arguing that Third Circuit’s decision “cut this Court’s
First Amendment holdings loose from their historical moorings in the centuries-
old tradition of open criminal proceedings”).
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nally devised by the Supreme Court.140  Unfortunately, these issues seem
destined to remain unresolved, because the Supreme Court denied the
judges’ Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.141  In denying the Petition, the
Supreme Court effectively refused to give practitioners—inside and
outside of the Third Circuit—guidance on how to correctly apply the logic
and experience test.142
B. Not as Bad as it Seems: Delaware’s Preeminence Is Not in Jeopardy
Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration program was created in order
to “preserve Delaware’s preeminence in offering cost-effective options for
resolving disputes, particularly those involving commercial, corporate, and
technology matters.”143  In attempting to justify its arbitration program,
Delaware has continuously pointed to the threat of losing adjudications to
private arbitrators.144
Despite Delaware’s insistence that this program is necessary to main-
tain its position as the preeminent state for incorporation, at least one
commentator has argued that “[t]he court’s ruling in Strine may not be as
big a blow as many may set it out to be for the state of Delaware . . . .”145
According to this commentator, one of the main reasons that businesses
incorporate in Delaware is because of the uniformity within the judicial
system, especially in the Court of Chancery.146  If closed arbitration were
to become the norm, then the large body of decisional law created by the
Court of Chancery would no longer be as enticing.147  Therefore, Dela-
140. See id. (arguing that application by Third Circuit is not consistent with
Supreme Court’s interpretation of test).
141. See Strine v. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014) (denying
petition for writ of certiorari).
142. For a further discussion of the differing applications of the logic and
experience test, see supra notes 101–28 and accompanying text.
143. See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 512 (3d Cir.
2013) (quoting H.B. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2009)) (explaining purpose of
Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration program).
144. See Quinn, supra note 13, at 832 (citing Brief for NASDAQ OMX Group
Inc. & NYSE EuroNext as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 8, Del. Coal.
for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D. Del. 2012) (No. 1:11-1015))
(stating that Delaware implemented its program to avoid losing potential adjudica-
tions to “arbitrators in New York, London, or Singapore”).  Quinn also noted that
Delaware feels that its “central position in the corporate law” is being threatened
by the possibility of corporations taking their business disputes to be arbitrated
outside of Delaware. See id.
145. See Kharatian, supra note 19, at 419 (arguing that having Delaware’s state-
sponsored arbitration program struck down will not be big blow to state’s preemi-
nent position as center of incorporation because Court of Chancery remains very
attractive option even without arbitration).
146. See id. (explaining that Court of Chancery’s body of decisional law is at-
tractive to businesses).
147. See id. at 419–20 (explaining importance of Court of Chancery’s body of
decisional law).  In addition, many large corporations prefer traditional litigation
when compared to arbitration. See id. at 420.  Further, most choice of law and
forum clauses are not negotiated and are instead standard, boilerplate language.
23
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ware’s Court of Chancery would continue to attract corporations and
might even be better off without closed arbitration proceedings.148
Another commentator has argued that having the provisions struck
down will actually benefit Delaware.149  While the arbitration program
would have probably ensured that Delaware remained competitive in the
short term, the program could have eventually weakened Delaware’s posi-
tion as the center of incorporation by decreasing its body of decisional
law.150  Additionally, the assumed benefits traditionally associated with ar-
bitration, such as speed, may not be as beneficial as previously thought.151
In terms of the speed of adjudication, the Court of Chancery is already
one of the quickest and most efficient courts in the country.152  Moreover,
although arbitration is a growing alternative to traditional adjudication, it
is far from being a dominant force.153  Thus, despite Delaware’s insistence
to the contrary, it may well retain its preeminent position as a destination
of incorporation despite the absence of a state-sponsored arbitration
program.154
C. New Hope for an Arbitration Program
Although some commentators believe Delaware will not be disadvan-
taged—or will even benefit—by having its arbitration program declared
unconstitutional, the newly elected Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme
Court, Leo E. Strine, Jr., disagrees.155  In his first State of the Judiciary
See id.  Thus, Delaware would still be a very attractive state to incorporate in with-
out the arbitration program. See id.
148. See id. (explaining how Delaware’s body of decisional law is one of main
reasons for its preeminence as destination of incorporation).
149. See Quinn, supra note 13, at 874–75 (explaining that state-sponsored ar-
bitration program is not in best long-term interests of Delaware).
150. See id. (arguing that Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration program
would ensure short-term competitiveness but weaken market for adjudications in
long term).  Quinn argues that the supposed benefits of Delaware’s state-spon-
sored arbitration program may not outweigh the cost of reducing the rule making
power of the Court of Chancery. See id.
151. See id. at 862 (explaining that many benefits associated with arbitrations,
such as speed, are already present in Court of Chancery).
152. See id. (explaining that arbitration program is not substantially faster
than formal Chancery Court proceedings).  To illustrate, a recent Delaware Chan-
cery Court case took just over six months from the date the initial complaint was
filed to the date the court issued the final order. See id. (citing Martin Marietta
Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072 (Del. Ch. 2012)).
153. See id. at 837 (highlighting that only small percentage of business dis-
putes are actually solved through arbitration).
154. See id. (explaining that benefits of incorporating in Delaware still exist
without state-sponsored arbitration program).
155. See generally Sean O’Sullivan, Strine Expects New Arbitration Program Will Re-
place “Secret Court”, THE NEWS J. (June 5, 2014, 9:57 AM), http://www.delawareon-
line.com/story/news/local/2014/06/04/strine-expects-new-arbitration-program-
will-replace-secret-court/9982751/ (explaining Chief Justice Strine’s plan to imple-
ment new arbitration program).
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address, Chief Justice Strine declared that a new proposal for a confiden-
tial arbitration program will be presented to the Delaware General Assem-
bly in January 2015.156  Chief Justice Strine is undeterred by the original
program being declared unconstitutional, stating:
Regrettably, a federal court in Philadelphia issued a divided rul-
ing striking down these statutes because they violated two judges’
reading of unsettled precedent, a reading that, if good law,
would invalidate long-standing dispute resolution procedures
used in their own federal court system . . . .  But, consistent with
our history, Delaware is not wallowing in defeat . . . .157
Chief Justice Strine believes the arbitration program is the key to keeping
Delaware competitive for corporate business, especially with the emerging
Latin American market.158  Despite his insistence on creating the pro-
gram, Chief Justice Strine was not clear on how the program would avoid
the issues that caused the Third Circuit to declare Delaware’s state-spon-
sored arbitration program unconstitutional in the first place.159
IV. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit’s decision in Strine illustrates the Third Circuit’s
approach to the logic and experience test and the existing dispute over
the test’s conflicting applications.160  This decision will have a tremendous
effect, not just on right of public access cases, but also on the state of
Delaware as it strives to keep pace with the growth in arbitration and main-
tain its position as the preeminent state of incorporation.161  The Su-
preme Court’s decision not to review the Third Circuit’s decision comes as
a blow not only to those who championed Delaware’s arbitration program,
but also to Third Circuit practitioners looking for guidance in applying
156. See Jeff Mordock, Judiciary Mulling Ways to Revive Arbitration Program, Strine
Says, DEL. L. WEEKLY (June 11, 2014), http://www.delawarelawweekly.com/id=
1202658780837/Judiciary-Mulling-Ways-to-Revive-Arbitration-Program-Strine-Says?
slreturn=20140721111823 (noting Chief Justice Strine explained his new arbitra-
tion program would be ready to be presented to Delaware General Assembly in
January 2015).
157. O’Sullivan, supra note 155 (quoting Chief Justice Strine).
158. See Mordock, supra note 156 (explaining importance of arbitration pro-
gram in keeping Delaware competitive as place of incorporation).
159. See O’Sullivan, supra note 155 (offering few details on specifics of new
program or how it would be different from program struck down in Strine).
160. See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 515–18 (3d Cir.
2013) (applying lenient standard to find right of public access to Delaware’s state-
sponsored arbitration program). But see id. at 523–26 (Roth, J., dissenting) (apply-
ing strict standard and arguing there should not be right of public access).
161. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 99, at 19–21 (arguing that
Delaware’s program is necessary to maintain its position as central place for incor-
poration). But see Quinn, supra note 13, at 875 (arguing that Delaware would be
“better served” by having arbitration program struck down).
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the logic and experience test.162  Though it appears Third Circuit practi-
tioners will have to wait for guidance, champions of Delaware’s arbitration
program may not have to wait much longer to see a new program in ac-
tion.  However, although Chief Justice Strine plans to have a new program
presented to the Delaware General Assembly in January 2015, whether the
new program will withstand judicial scrutiny after the Third Circuit’s deci-
sion in Strine remains to be seen.163
162. For a further discussion of the diverging applications of the logic and
experience test, see supra notes 104–28 and accompanying text.
163. For a further discussion of Chief Justice Strine’s plan to introduce a new
arbitration program, see supra notes 155–59 and accompanying text.
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